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A bstract
Classical welfare economics demonstrates potential Pareto improvements from 
“supply-side” policy changes that increase the efficiency of aggregate production. 
Special cases reviewed here concern market integration in customs unions and the 
gains from international trade. These classical results rely on incentive incom­
patible lump-sum compensation of losers. Some extensions to second-best welfare 
economics are presented. They require that governments freeze most of the pa­
rameters of each consumer’s budget set, leaving flexible producer prices to clear 
markets, and uniform poll subsidies to generate actual Pareto improvements. Gen­
erally, supply-side reforms are only beneficial when combined with other suitable 






















































































































































































Standard neoclassical welfare economics not only displays the logical connec­
tions between perfectly competitive and Pareto efficient allocations of resources. 
It goes on to claim that there are gains to free international trade and other forms 
of market liberalizing “supply side” policies. These move the economy out toward 
its Pareto frontier. It is true that liberalization may harm some unfortunate indi­
viduals, but there is anyway a potential Pareto improvement. This would become 
an actual Pareto improvement if the gainers were made to compensate the losers, 
which they can more than afford to do. Moreover, the Scitovsky (1941) reversal 
test is passed; if the market liberalizing policy were to be reversed, there is no way 
in which any gainers from this reverse could compensate all the losers.
The practical limitations of the standard neoclassical argument have now 
become all too apparent. For that argument requires the gainers to compensate 
the losers by means of lump-sum transfers, bearing no relation at all to individuals’ 
transactions in the liberalized economy. Such transfers are impractical because, in 
order that the losers do all get fully compensated, they must depend on what each 
individual’s pattern of trade would have been in the absence of the liberalizing 
reform. Yet this is rarely known with any certainty and so, as Feenstra (1990) 
has recently emphasized, individuals themselves would have every incentive to 
make excessive claims concerning the damage that they have suffered because of 
liberalization. Indeed, even those who really do gain from liberalization have 
an incentive to claim that they too have suffered damage. Many “potential” 
Pareto improvements are therefore illusory, since there is really no possibility of 
arranging the lump-sum transfers necessary to convert them into actual Pareto 
improvements.
Even without assuming that lump-sum compensation is possible, Diamond 
and Mirrlees (1971) gave alternative sufficient conditions for efficient production 
still to be generally desirable. In order to convert a move toward the production 




























































































compensated by adjustments to commodity taxes and subsidies, including those 
on different kinds of labour, rad also to taxes on dividends. Actually, Diamond 
and Mirrlees assume in most of their work that the government would always 
set taxes on each separate commodity differentially in order to maximize some 
Paretian Bergson social welfare function. Certainly their assumptions imply that 
the government has available a wide enough range of tax instruments to ensure 
that consumer prices can be held fixed while producer prices are varied in order 
to balance supply and demand for each good. We shall assume that firms’ after 
tax dividend payments to their shareholders can be held fixed as well. Then 
no consumer need become worse off as a result of an induced price change or a 
reduction in dividend income, so it no longer matters that lump-sum compensation 
is impossible. Indeed, a price, wage and dividend freeze, together with increased 
production efficiency, creates a surplus for the government. This can be used to 
pay a poll subsidy, or to make some other tax change which benefits all consumers.
This paper will both synthesize these results and examine carefully the condi­
tions for their validity. In fact, four related propositions will be considered. After 
Section 2 has presented the basic model and assumptions, Sections 3 to 6 consider 
our main results concerning the gains from creating a customs union. Whether 
the formation of a customs union is welfare increasing was for long a rather diffi­
cult question to answer. After all, when several nations free trade barriers among 
them and establish a common external tariff, there is the efficiency enhancing ef­
fect of trade creation. This is generally welfare increasing in first best economies. 
But there may also be an offsetting efficiency decreasing effect of trade diversion, 
because imposing a common external tariff may divert production toward higher 
cost producers — see, for instance, Viner (1931, 1950), Meade (1956), Scitovsky 
(1958), Lipsey (1960, 1970), Krauss (1972), Miller and Spencer (1977), and many 
other papers cited therein.
Despite the complication of trade diversion, Sections 3 to 6 consider different 




























































































which not only benefits the countries forming the union, but even does no damage 
to countries which are excluded from it. The key idea for this result emanates 
from Kemp (1964), which was then reformulated by Kemp and Wan (1976), and 
finally extended by Grinols (1981). The result shows how, when a customs union 
is formed, there will exist both a vector of common external tariffs and a system 
of lump-sum transfers between consumers in the nations belonging to the union, 
such that nobody in the world, either inside or outside the union, is worse off with 
the customs union than without it. The argument relies on the union being able to 
maintain an external tariff so that border prices are frozen, as is the total amount 
of trade in each commodity which the union as a whole carries out with the rest 
of the world. In particular, there is none of the trade diversion which plays such 
a prominent role in the older literature on customs unions. Within the union, 
however, there are no tariffs and so there will be a common producer price vector.
To establish this result, Section 3 first considers the special case when each 
nation has a lone representative consumer. Next, Section 4 raises the issue of how 
to distribute the potential gains, in order to convert a potential Pareto improve­
ment into an actual one. Thereafter Section 5 presents the classical result, which 
is when lump-sum transfers can be used to achieve such a Pareto improvement. 
Finally, Section 6 demonstrates how to combine price, wage and dividend freezes 
with uniform national poll subsidies in all the nations of the union in order to 
generate a Pareto improvement.
The rest of the paper shows how a number of other standard propositions are 
really straightforward corollaries of this key result for customs unions. Section 7 
begins with the first of the two classical results on the gains from trade due to 
Samuelson (1939, 1962), Kemp (1962), Grandmont and McFadden (1972), Dixit 
and Norman (1980, 1986), with discussion by Kemp and Wan (1986), etc. It states 
that worldwide free trade is superior to autarky. Such free trade is a special case of 
a customs union which extends over the whole world after starting with no trade 




























































































ability of improving aggregate production efficiency in a closed economy, which is 
the special case of a customs union with one nation only and no external trade.
Thereafter, Section 9 considers the other of the two classical theorems con­
cerning the gains from trade. This states that a small country with no influence 
over its terms of trade is better off with free trade than with any kind of managed 
trade. It is the special case of a closed economy with an additional foreign trade 
sector that functions like an additional producer. A major implication arises in 
connection with the theory of project evaluation and the standard but contentious 
claim that, under certain conditions, border prices should be used as shadow prices 
for traded goods, and producer prices for non-traded goods — for extensive dis­
cussion of this claim see Little and Mirrlees (1974), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1974), 
Blitzer, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981), Bell and Devarajan (1983), Diewert (1983), 
Dixit (1985), Hammond (1986), Mookherjee (1986), Dreze and Stern (1987), etc. 
Section 10 considers project evaluation in general, and shows that this claim is 
valid under somewhat weaker conditions than has usually been recognized.
Finally, Section 11 discusses practical limitations to the validity of all these 
results. The main conclusion which emerges is that the benefits of market oriented 
supply side policies may not be anything like as robust or universal as many 
economists seem to believe, judging from their generally favourable attitude to 
almost indiscriminate market liberalization, especially on the supply side of the 
economy.
An appendix presents the main proof of the existence of an equilibrium in the 
model of Section 6 with frozen consumer prices and dividends, but with flexible 




























































































2. Notation, Model and Assumptions
The customs union is assumed to come together from a finite set K  of nations 
which are indexed by k. Suppose that there is a finite set G of physical commodi­
ties, so that the commodity space is the Euclidean space Assume too that 
G =  Ut6K-JV*UT can be partitioned into the disjoint sets TV* of non-traded goods 
specific to each nation k £ K ,  together with the set T  of traded goods.
Nation k’s economy consists of a finite set of consumers and a finite set Jk of 
firms. Internationally owned firms are excluded, as is the migration of consumers 
and workers. The set of all consumers in the union is I  U keK Ik and the set 
of all producers is J  := UkeK Jk- When public production has to be considered, 
any publicly owned firms in each country k will simply be included in the set Jk- 
That also allows us to discuss the evaluation of public sector projects.
For each consumer i £  / ,  let X ‘ denote i ’s set of feasible net trade vectors, 
whose typical member is x'. Assume that each set X ' is a closed and convex subset 
of RG satisfying 0 £ X '. The latter condition says that autarky is feasible for each 
consumer, but it does not imply that each consumer can actually survive without 
trade. Suppose also that each set X ' has some lower bound x' for which x' £ X ' 
implies x' x'. Finally, if g £  Nk U T, so that good g is neither internationally 
traded nor a non-traded good specific to nation k, then it is assumed that xj =  0 
whenever i £ Ik and x ‘ £ X ' because no individual in nation k can trade the 
good.
In addition, each consumer i is assumed to have an ordinal utility function 
{/' : X 1 —» 3? which is continuous, quasi-concave, and locally non-satiated in the 
sense that, if x' £ X ' and N  is any open set in 5RG for which x' £ N ,  then there 
exists x' £  X ' fl N  with U'(x')  >  U‘(x’). This is a fairly standard assumption 
in general equilibrium theory. Notice that it is a significant weakening of the 
more customary monotonicity assumption, which we avoid because it would be 
inconsistent with consumers in each nation being unable to trade the non-traded 




























































































For each consumer i £  I,  let m' denote i's total unearned (net) income from 
dividends paid by firms and from government transfers. Also, for each m' and 
consumer price vector q ^  0, let B ,(q ,m ‘) := { x 1 £ X '  | qx' <  m' } denote i ’s 
budget set. Then the above assumptions imply that each i 6 I  has a utility max­
imizing demand correspondence £'(g,m ') := arg max,, { U'(x') \ x' £  B'(q, rn') } 
which: (a) has a non-empty convex value for every consumer price vector j  >  0 
and every income level m' large enough to ensure that B'(q, m') is non-empty; 
(b) is upper hemi-continuous (in particular, it has a closed graph) whenever there 
is a cheaper point x' £ X '  with qx' <  m'; and (c) satisfies the budget exhaustion 
condition that qx' =  m' for all x' £  £'(</,m ‘). In fact, of course, (b) and (c) are 
true whenever q ^  0, whether or not q 0.
Each producer j  £ J  is assumed to have a production set Y 1 C of feasible 
net output vectors, whose typical member is y1, and which satisfies 0 £  F J. The 
aggregate production sets Ft := Y lj£ jk Y 1 of the nations k £ K  are assumed to 
be closed and convex. They are also assumed to satisfy the property that, for 
each aggregate lower bound y £ on union-wide net outputs, and so for each 
upper bound —y on net inputs, the constrained set of international production 
distributions
within the union is bounded. In other words, bounded inputs in the union as a 
whole allow only bounded aggregate inputs and outputs in each separate nation of 
the union. Finally, if g £  TV*. U T, then it is assumed that yj =  0 whenever j  £ Jk 
and y1 £ Y J, so that no firm in nation k can have a non-zero net supply of good 
9-
The paper is about potential Pareto improvements to a given initial allocation 
(x 1, yJ ) in the customs union, where
x 1 := (x')ig/; y J := <y




























































































net output vectors, respectively. The associated net import vector in each country 
k £  K  will be denoted by
zk : =  y  x < - Y  y>
which must also be the aggregate excess demand vector. Let w denote the world 
price vector at which countries outside the union trade with those inside. It is 
assumed that each nation k of the union must observe some balance of trade 
constraint of the form w z k =  bk, where zk denotes the net import vector and bk 
denotes the maximum allowable trade deficit — which may well be zero, or even 
negative for nations with past debts that need servicing.
No producer prices will be specified for the initial allocation because it will 
typically be assumed that there is not necessarily even any nation in which pro­
duction is efficient before the reform. For some results, however, it will be assumed 
that there are initial consumer prices qk in each nation k, with associated unearned 
incomes m' := qk x' for each consumer i £ Ik, such that x ’ €  £*(</*, m").
After the customs union has been formed, it is assumed that both the world 
price vector w and the aggregate net import vector z := "}ZkeK z k of the customs 
union as a whole are left unchanged. Furthermore, all internal tariffs are assumed 
to be abolished, leading to free international trade within the customs union. 
After the change, therefore, there will be a common producer price vector p  which 
applies to each firm throughout the union. This price vector will be different 
from w  because of the vector p — w  of common external tariffs on each traded 
commodity. We assume that tariffs p  — w and producer prices p  all adjust to 
clear markets within the customs union while external prices w  and aggregate net 
imports z remain fixed. Thus both external tariffs and internal producer prices are 
endogenous. Finally, let qk denote the price vector facing all consumers in country 
k. It will differ from the producer price vector p because of commodity or linear 
income taxes whose magnitudes in nation k must be the appropriate components 




























































































We consider a supply side policy change which induces each producer j  £ J 
to maximize profit, whatever ,he producer price vector p ^  0 may be. So, let
v j (p)
7T>(p)
max { p yj  | yJ e K ' }  
y‘
denote firm j 's  profit-maximizing net supply vectors and maximized profits at the 
price vector p. Note that 7rJ(p) >  0 because of our assumption that 0 6  Y 1. Of 
course, it is possible that T)J(p) =  0 and ir3(p) =  +oo. Nevertheless, for each nation 
k 6 K  and producer price vector p £ P,  let
Vk(p) ■= T , j e j k V3(p)  =  arg
*■*(?) :=  x’ ip) =
max { p yk | Vk € Yk } yk
denote respectively the profit maximizing aggregate net supply correspondence 
and the maximum possible aggregate profit.
Our final assumption is that forming the customs union really does improve 
overall production efficiency within the union, and also within each separate nation 
k 6 K .  Specifically, suppose that the original aggregate net output vector y := 
Y ljzJ  V1 *s n°t on the frontier of aggregate production set Y  := S j g j  but in 
the interior. It is assumed, moreover, that if y =  YjjeJ  's on Ihe frontier of 
Y ,  then ^jeJk  yJ ^  ^jeJu y1 for each k 6  K .  In other words, it is impossible 
to re-organize production efficiently within the union as a whole without changing 
the aggregate net output in each nation of the union. Of course, when these 
assumptions are met, there cannot be any price vector p ^  0 at which y maximizes 
profits over Y ,  and so it must be true that YsjeJ n3(p) >  Py for all p ^  0. 
Moreover, since each nation must move from y t  in order that the union’s aggregate 
net output vector should reach the boundary of Y , it must be true that 7rjt(p) > prjk 
for every p ^  0. Note that this does not require firms to make more profit from 
the reform. But it does require the producers in each country k £ K  to earn 
more aggregate profit after the reform than they would have made, at the same 




























































































3. The Representative Consumer Case
As is to be expected, the argument is clearest when each nation joining the 
union has just one representative consumer, who is also the sole owner of all the 
nation’s firms. The subscript i to denote an individual can therefore be dropped. 
Because of the free interned market, all goods will be bought and sold by both 
the representative consumer of each member nation and by all producers within 
the union at a common market clearing price vector p, provided that such a price 
vector exists.
Without at least one further policy measure, it may not be true that form­
ing a customs union will by itself make even representative consumers in each of 
its member states better off. The reason is that, because of changing patterns 
of international trade within the union, some of its nations may lose too much 
tariff revenue when they move to an internal common market and a common ex­
ternal tariff. So we shall follow the gains from customs unions literature cited 
in the introduction, as well as Ohyama (1972), and postulate inter-governmental 
transfers which compensate for the loss of tariff revenue. Specifically, when the 
flexible internal market producer price vector is p, while the common external 
tariff maintains the union’s border price vector fixed at w, we assume that each 
country k £ K  will still receive an amount R k(p) := (p — w) zk in revenue, even if 
its net import vector shifts away from 2*. Since the aggregate net import vector of 
the whole community remains unchanged at 2, however, it follows that the total 
revenue from the common external tariff is R(p) := (p — w) z — YlkeK ^k(p)- 
This revenue therefore gets divided up between countries in a way which reflects 
the original rather than the new pattern of imports and exports within the union. 
After including allowable net borrowing bk, the resulting total unearned income of 
the representative consumer of country k is then
m*(p) :=  (P - w ) z k  +  bk +  7TIt(p) =  p z k +  7r*(p).
The earlier assumption of improved efficiency within each nation k £ K  implies, 





























































































”1k(p) =  1 2k +  TTjfc(p) > p z k +  pyk =  p x k,
so that the representative consumer in each nation k € K  always has more than 
sufficient income to purchase Xjt, no matter what price vector p ^  0 may occur in 
any new equilibrium. In particular, after the union has been formed, no country’s 
representative consumer can be forced down to a cheapest point of the feasible set 
X k , so avoiding the kind of “exceptional case” first noticed by Arrow (1951). Given 
all our other assumptions, this will therefore be sufficient to ensure that, after the 
customs union has been created, a union-wide competitive or Walrasian equilib­
rium (x ,y ,p ) really does exist. Such an equilibrium must satisfy the properties 
that:
(i) for all firms j  £ J, the net output vector y3 satisfies y 3 £ V3{p), and so 
maximizes profits at producer prices p;
(ii) the representative consumer of each nation k £ K  has a net trade vector Xk 
maximizing utility Uk(xk) subject to the feasibility constraint Xk £ Xk  and 
the budget constraint pxk  <  mjt(p);
(iii) the market clearing condition z := Ylkeh' =  J2k£K — S j g j  V1 ‘s satis­
fied.
Moreover, the strict inequality m t (p) >  px* (all k £ K )  clearly implies that each 
country’s representative consumer is strictly better off as a result of free trade.
As for the rest of the world, it can remain completely unaffected by the 
formation of the union. Its pattern of trade with the union as a whole is ex­
actly the same as it was before, without any change in prices or quantities, even 
though it may be doing more trade with some members of the union which 
is compensated by doing less with others. Since neither the prices at which 
it trades with the union nor the aggregate quantities of imports from and ex­
ports to the union are affected, there is no reason for the rest of the world 





























































































It is noteworthy that this classical result on the benefit of forming a customs 
union involves passing Scitovsky’s reversal test. The reason is that the final allo­
cation is Pareto efficient in the union’s economy when the aggregate net import 
vector is z — YlkeK  Because mjt(p) > p x t  (all k 6 K ),  the original allocation 
cannot possibly be Pareto superior or even Pareto indifferent to the post-reform 
allocation, so Scitovsky’s reversal test is indeed passed.
4. Distributing the Potential Gains
In general each member state of the customs union has more than just a lone 
representative consumer. Then, obviously, simply increasing the aggregate real 
income of all consumers in each nation does not guarantee a Pareto improvement. 
Consumers who supply specialized labour skills to industries which are uncompet­
itive at the new equilibrium prices will usually find themselves significantly worse 
off because they have lost the main source of their livelihood. So may some of those 
who own the firms in such industries. To demonstrate that an increase in the total 
real income of each nation is truly a potential Pareto improvement therefore in­
volves finding some redistribution scheme which could actually compensate these 
losers. Thus are the aggregate gains to all consumers from freer trade arranged in 
a way that allows each individual consumer to benefit.
In our model there will be a government in each nation of the union with 
the power to use two different kinds of redistributive instrument. The first is 
direct lump-sum redistribution between all the different consumers in the econ­
omy. Using an argument similar to Grandmont and McFadden’s (1972), Section 
5 below will exhibit a feasible transfer scheme ensuring that each consumer’s net 
trade vector is no worse than in the original unreformed allocation. This transfer 
mechanism depends on private information, however, and so will disappear from 
the policymaker’s true feasible set once informational constraints are taken into 
account. The second possibility, which is somewhat less unrealistic, is that each 
government has the power to impose upon transactions between national produc­




























































































as in Diamond and Mirrlees’ (1971) model of optimal commodity taxation. Sec­
tion 6 therefore considers ho-, to combine a consumer price, wage and dividend 
freeze with a uniform poll subsidy, in order to distribute profits in a way which is 
incentive compatible.
As in the case of a single representative consumer, in any new competitive 
equilibrium there will be a single price vector p faced by all producers in the 
union simultaneously. Dividend payments and lump-sum taxes and subsidies then 
together redistribute the total profits 7rj.(p) of all producers in each nation k £ K ,  
as well as the external tariff revenue Rk(p) =  (p — to) z* and the allowable level of 
external borrowing 6*, between the different consumers of that nation. Since the 
sum of these net transfers must depend on p, so in general must all the transfers 
themselves. So let m'(p) denote the function determining the unearned income of 
each consumer i £ I. Obviously, it will be assumed that, for each nation k £ K ,  
the aggregate budget constraint
5 2  m '(p) =  ( p - w ) z k +  bk +  tr*(p) =  p z t  +  7r*(p)
is always satisfied; this implies that each country simply redistributes its own 
national wealth, and that there are no international transfers other than the ap­
propriate distribution of common external tariff revenue which was used in the 
representative consumer case discussed above. Commodity taxation also serves 
to determine how the consumer price vector qk in each nation k £  K  depends 
upon the producer price vector p. Let qk(p) represent this functional dependence. 
Finally, it is also assumed that, for all k £  K ,  the functions m'(p) (i £ Ik) and 
qk(p) are all continuous and homogeneous of degree one in producer prices p.
Now, converting the potential gains from a customs union to actual gains 
requires finding some equilibrium producer price vector p for the union as a whole, 
together with net transfers m'(p) to each consumer i £ Ik, and national commodity 
tax systems giving rise to consumer prices qk(p) for each nation k £  K .  Such 
an equilibrium will also involve net output vectors yJ £ ij-’(p) (all j  £ Ik) and 




























































































(i) all consumers are better off because U'(x') > U'(x') for all i 6 /;
(ii) the union’s aggregate resource balance constraint Z)ig/ * ’ -  Y j j e j  y1 =  z  is 
satisfied.
Section 3 found such an improvement for the special case of a representative con­
sumer in each nation.
5. The Classical Theorem
In the classical case, the government is allowed to redistribute income by 
means of lump-sum transfers. Then an appropriate compensation scheme is that 
constructed by Grinds (1981), based in turn upon that devised earlier by Grand- 
mont and McFadden (1972) for the special case discussed in Section 7 below where 
free trade is compared with autarky. Each individual will be assured more income 
than is needed to allow the original consumption bundle to be purchased at the 
new post-union equilibrium prices.
Specifically, after the union has been formed, the consumer price in each 
nation k 6 K  of the union is taken to be qk(p) =  p because throughout the union 
no commodity taxes are imposed. As in Section 2 above, we assume that the 
supply side policy change really does improve production efficiency within each 
nation k £ K ,  in the sense that jr*(p) >  PVJ' f°r every p ^  0. Finally,
in order to ensure that all consumers in any nation k really do benefit from the 
customs union, arrange the transfers m'(p) to satisfy m'(p) >  p i*  (all t 6  I)  for 
every p ^  0. An obvious example is when the transfer functions in each nation 
k £  K  take the linear form
m'(p) =  p x '  +  9\  [ir*(p) -  Y l jeJt p y3}
for any set of positive “distributive” weights 8\ (i £ Ik) satisfying Y lieh  =  T 
Then Y l,e lk m '(p) =  P%k +  Xk(p) — p y t  =  pzk  +  tt*(p) Moreover, no consumer 
i can be forced down to a cheapest point of the feasible set X '.  Therefore our 




























































































and price vector p, and also imply that every consumer is strictly better off as a 
result of the policy reform.
Notice that the transfer system considered in this section must depend upon 
the net trade vector x' which each consumer would have had in the allocation 
without reform. Usually the national governments do not know this. If some kind 
of revelation mechanism were instituted to discover it, asking consumers to report 
what transactions each would have made if the economy had remained unreformed, 
then there would always be an incentive for them to cheat by claiming more com­
pensation than they really need — and by claiming to need compensation when 
they are actually better off even without it. So the classical transfer mechanism 
used in this section depends on private information in a way that makes it dis­
appear from the policymaker’s true feasible set once informational constraints are 
taken into account. The next section considers how to combine a price, wage and 
dividend freeze with a uniform poll subsidy, in order to distribute the gains from 
forming the customs union in a way which is incentive compatible.
Once again Scitovsky’s reversal test is passed in this classical result on the 
benefit of increased production efficiency. Again, this is because the final allo­
cation is Pareto efficient in the union economy. Because of our assumption that 
S y g j  P(vJ ~  y3) >  0, there is no way that the original allocation can be Pareto 
superior or even Pareto indifferent to the post-reform allocation, so Scitovsky’s 
reversal test is indeed passed.
6. Poll Subsidies with Frozen Prices, Wages, and Dividends
As is surely more realistic, suppose that the government has too little informa­
tion about consumers’ characteristics to use lump-sum compensation for those who 
would otherwise lose from the policy reform. Instead we only allow combinations 
of commodity taxes (or subsidies) with uniform poll subsidies (or taxes). Note 
that poll subsidies are equivalent to universal tax credits. Such taxes and sub­
sidies depend only on the entire distribution of characteristics in the population. 




























































































economy no individual consumer has the power to affect these taxes, and so no 
incentive to manipulate.
In order to prove that potential Pareto improvements exist even without lump­
sum transfers, we shall allow ourselves some extra assumptions compared with 
the previous classical case. First, we require that the original allocation Xk to 
consumers in each nation k 6 K  be supported by a national consumer price vector 
qk and by incomes m', in the sense that all consumers i € /* maximize U' subject 
to the budget constraint qk x' <  in’. The production sector, however, may not be 
maximizing profits at any prices at all. Second, suppose that each consumer i £ j  
has a single-valued vector demand set £'(9*, m') =  {S'} when faced with the initial 
budget constraint qk x' <  in'. These two assumptions will play Em important role 
in ensuring that benefits csm be passed on to all consumers by means of a uniform 
poll subsidy. Note that the second requirement is an automatic implication of the 
first when each consumer’s utility function is strictly quasi-concave. Indeed, such 
strict quasi-concavity implies that each consumer’s demand function be single­
valued everywhere; here, however, it is enough to have it be single-valued for the 
initial budget constraint.
In this framework, Dixit and Norman (1980, pp. 79-80 and 191-3) considered 
the implications of either replacing autarky by free trade, or forming a customs 
union incorporating Ohyama’s (1972) rule of compensation for tariff revenue. They 
show how such reforms, when combined with a consumer pried freeze, can gener­
ate a (non-negative) surplus for the government(s) without making any consumer 
worse off. Later, Dixit and Norman (1986) discuss how appropriate tax changes 
can make this surplus take the form of an excess supply of each commodity. Then, 
provided that surplus commodities can be thrown away, such tax changes allow 
either a small increase in the consumer price of any good such as labour which 
everybody sells, or a smcill reduction in the consumer price of any good which 
everybody buys. Their argument is therefore similar to that given by Diamond 




























































































efficient — see also Weymark (1979), who shows how small tax changes on groups 
of commodities may suffice to generate Pareto improvements. By contrast, we 
shall show that a Pareto superior equilibrium exists without any excess supplies 
of commodities that need to be disposed of. In addition, we allow firms to make 
profits, though we shall require dividend payments to be frozen. Finally, the later 
tax adjustments used by Dixit and Norman, etc., to guarantee an eventual Pareto 
improvement depend on knowing of at least one good which is either bought by 
everybody or else sold by everybody, and whose tax or subsidy rate can be varied 
independently of those on all other commodities. Instead, like Dixit (1985), we 
only rely on a uniform poll subsidy (or tax credit).
In order to have a robust procedure ensuring that no consumer can possibly 
be hurt by any price or dividend change, we therefore assume that each nation 
k G K  has its consumer price vector qk frozen at its original level qk. Since the 
producer price vector p  must be the same everywhere within the customs union, 
this implies that each nation is arranging its own commodity taxes in order to 
freeze its own consumer prices. In particular, there must be no moves toward 
harmonizing different nations’ commodity tax rates within the union. We also 
assume that all consumers in each nation k G K  first have any dividends and 
other transfers which make up their unearned income m' frozen at the values m ! 
which would apply in the absence of any reform, but that they then receive income 
supplements in the form of a nationwide uniform poll subsidy s k. The overall result 
will be that each consumer i G Ik faces the budget constraint qk x' <  m* +  s k. So 
each consumer throughout the union really will benefit if s k >  0 for all k G K ,  
and if integrated markets clear. As in Sections 3 and 5, nobody outside the union 
is forced to become worse off either because the union’s aggregate net imports 
from outside remain unchanged at z and the price vector at which they are traded 
remains at w.
There is now one fairly easy special case. This is when it is possible to have 




























































































additional assumptions are satisfied:
(i) qk 0 for all k 6  K  (or, since consumers in country k can only trade 
commodities in the set IV* U T, prices of other commodities are irrelevant, so 
it is enough to assume that q̂ iiUT 0);
(ii) £'(g*, m' +  s) is a single-valued demand function x'(s), for all k £ K  and all
i e  Ik-
Then the new aggregate net demand in the union is given by the continuous 
function x(s) := Xltg/c £*(*)• After subtracting the net import vector z,
the vector of net demands which needs to be met by production within the union 
is x(s) — z. It will be enough to find a uniform positive level of s with the property 
that x(s) — z intersects the boundary of the (convex) aggregate production set 
Y  := Y 1 ■ For then there will be a price vector p /  0 which supports Y  at
a point x(s) — z. If this price vector emerges as the producer price vector, then 
producers in the union will be willing to choose a profile y J of net output vectors 
which satisfies j  y1 =  x(s) — z. So all markets will clear and this will be an 
equilibrium of the required form. Profits in excess of the frozen dividends will be 
taxed away and used in helping to finance the uniform poll subsidy. Budgets will 
balance overall.
So now we need to show that there is a positive s for which x(s) — z  lies on 
the boundary of Y .  First, since x'(0) =  x' for all i € I, it follows that
x(0) — z =  x — z =  y e  iut Y
because of the assumption that initial production gives an aggregate net output 
vector y not on the frontier of the union’s aggregate production set Y.
Now recall that x' denotes a lower bound to consumer i ’s feasible set X ' . 
Recall also how it was assumed that, when x is used to denote Yliel — ■ ^le 
truncated set Y K(x) of international production profiles satisfying YlkEK Slk=2L 
is bounded, because bounded inputs can produce only bounded outputs. From this 




























































































is also bounded. Now, for all k £ K  and i € /*, local non-satiation implies that 
qk [z'(s) — x'] =  fh‘ +  s — qk x \  because of budget exhaustion. The right hand 
side evidently tends to infinity a s s - *  +oo. Thus the Euclidean norm of the non­
negative vector x '(s) — x' also tends to infinity a s s - *  + 00. So therefore does the 
Euclidean norm of the sum x(s) — x =  fc'M  — £.']• Hence x(s) — z must lie 
outside the bounded set Y(x)  for large enough s. Since x(s) =  x, this implies that 
x(s) — z $ Y  for large enough s. The set of s for which x(s) — z d Y  must therefore 
have a least upper bound which we denote by 5. Because x(s)  is continuous and 
Y  is closed, it must be true that x(s) — z lies on the boundary of Y . Because 
x(0) — z =  y 6 int Y ,  it follows that s >  0, as required.
This relatively simple argument is not really good enough, however. There are 
unnecessary extra assumptions, but more serious is the fact that financing a union 
wide uniform poll subsidy will usually require international redistribution. It is 
therefore more interesting to show that, even with uniform poll subsidies s k (k 6 
K )  that are specific to each nation which are entirely financed by national taxation 
and each nation’s appropriate share of the external tariff revenue, there still exists 
a competitive equilibrium when consumer prices are frozen, but producer prices are 
free to adjust because of commodity taxes, and when any additional (or reduced) 
profits that result from the policy reform are fully taxed away (or compensated) 
by the governments. The existence proof we provide uses a somewhat involved 
fixed point argument, which is therefore left for the appendix.
In Sections 3 and 5 above we explained why the classical result on the ben­
efit of forming a customs union involves passing Scitovsky’s reversal test. In the 
“distorted” economy with commodity taxation, however, the earlier argument is 
invalid. It is virtually certain, after all, that the post-reform allocation will not 
even be constrained Pareto efficient. It is therefore just possible, though somewhat 
unlikely, that undoing the supply-side reform, going back to the original alloca­
tion, and then introducing some other reform that affects only the demand side 




























































































superior to what emerges from the policy reform being considered in this section. 
If this were the case, then Scitovsky’s reversal test would fail.
7. Free TVade is Superior to Autarky
Free international trade amounts to having a customs union embracing the 
whole world. Starting with autarky implies that, in effect, z* =  0 (all k 6 K )  
because there are no initial net imports. It follows that the level of tariff revenue 
compensation satisfies Rk(p) =  0 for all k £ K  and all possible producer prices p. 
This explains the classical result concerning the gains from free trade compared 
to autarky, even in the absence of any international lump-sum transfers. It bears 
repeating, however, that this result depends on the possibility of paying national 
lump-sum compensation and/or of freezing consumer prices, wages, and dividends 
in the same way as in Sections 3 to 6.
8. The Potential Gains from Increased Production Efficiency
When the supply side of the (world) economy becomes more efficient as a 
whole, there is a sense in which this case subsumes all the others considered here. 
Examples of such increased efficiency that either have been considered already or 
will be considered later on include moves away from managed trade or autarky 
toward free trade (Sections 7 and 9), as well as the formation of a customs union, 
as discussed in Sections 3 to 6. Customs unions were dealt with first only because 
their analysis is rather more complicated, and so the argument needs to be set out 
in greater detail. All the other results are easy corollaries of those which apply to 
customs unions. In a single closed economy, of course, there is no rest of the world, 
nor is there any international trade or compensation for lost tariff revenue to worry 
about. That greatly simplifies the discussion without changing the fundamental 
nature of the earlier results.
Other important applications of the same result are to competition policy and 




























































































not permit a serious discussion here of monopoly power and imperfect competition, 
or of the measures for alleviating their adverse efficiency and welfare effects. This 
is left for later work.
9. The Potential Gains from TVade in a Small Country
Consider now just one small trading nation. As in Section 2, assume that the 
set of goods G can be partitioned into the two disjoint sets T  of traded goods and 
N  of non-traded goods. A typical vector x (E will be written in the partitioned 
form (x t , x n ) 6 x =  3JG. Assume too that the nation faces a constant 
border price vector p j  for traded goods which is independent of its trade pattern. 
The nation must then observe some balance of trade constraint of the form
£ * ,  Pt 4 - £ >€JPt ^ < 6 ,
where b denotes the maximum allowable deficit. This implies that we can represent 
the possibilities for foreign trade by including in the set J an extra firm f  with a 
production set of the form
y ‘  ■■= { (y^y 'N) e  * T x x N | y 'N =  o; p T y{  < 6 }.
Because of arbitrage possibilities, it will then be enough to consider only producer 
price vectors of the form (p t iPat) for some non-traded good price vector pjv € N.
Now we can proceed as in Sections 3 to 6 in order to compare free with man­
aged trade. Indeed, there are very few changes needed in the analysis of that 
section. The only real difference is that the different resource balance constraints 
for traded goods need replacing by the above single balance of trade constraint. 
However, since the traded goods price vector p j  is invariable, one can treat all 
traded goods together as if they were a single Hicksian composite commodity, for 






























































































Another important example is of a project whose net output vector z  has 
positive value at the relevant shadow prices. In fact, in order to ensure that the 
aggregate production set is convex even after allowing for the choice of whether to 
adopt the project or not, it will be assumed that the scale of the project can be 
made arbitrarily small. Thus, the project is assumed to have the effect of replacing 
a null initial production set Y p := {0} by the new production set Y p  := [0, z], 
where
[0, z] := co{0, z) =  { y P | 3A 6  [0,1] : y p =  X z } 
denotes the line interval of points that are convex combinations of the two end­
points 0 and z. The corresponding profit function for the project is
7i P(p) ■= max { p y P | y P € [0, z] } =  max { X pz \ \  6 [0,1] } =  m axjpz, 0 }. 
yp >■
Our test of increasing maximum total profit at all possible producer prices 
can be expressed as p y  < it(p) -f 7rp(p) for all p yl 0. An uninteresting special 
case occurs when y 6 int Y ,  because then this test is already passed, and so a 
potential Pareto gain is possible, without any need to adopt the project even on a 
small scale. Accordingly we assume that y is on the boundary of Y.  Then, since
Y  is assumed to be a convex set, there is a non-empty set
•P(y) : = { p / 0 | V y e F  -p y  < p y }  =  { P ^  0 | r̂(p) =  py }
of corresponding support or producer price vectors at which aggregate profits are 
maximized when the aggregate net output vector is y. When the boundary of Y  
is smooth at y, then P(y) will consist of non-negative multiples of the normal to
Y  at y, in which case it is enough to consider just one price vector in the tests set 
out below. When Y  has a corner at y, however, there will be a non-trivial convex 
cone of possible supporting price vectors to consider.
With this extra assumption, the test p y  <  tt(p) +  7rP(p) for all p ^  0 is 
evidently satisfied only if p y  <  tt(p) +  7rP(p) =  p y  +  7rp(p) for all p e  P(y).  This 




























































































Conversely, suppose that p y  =  7r(p) +  irp (p) for some price vector p ^  0. 
Because p y  <  n(p) and 0 <  7rp(p) for all p  ^  0, this is only possible if p y  =  ir(p) 
and 0 =  itP(p). But then p £ P(y)  and yet p z  <  0. The condition p z  >  0 for all 
p £ P(y)  is therefore sufficient to ensure that p y  <  7r(p) +  n P(p) for every price 
vector p 0.
So the cost-benefit test p z  >  0 for all p £ P(y)  represents a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the project, when adopted on a suitable scale, to give rise to 
a production efficiency gain of the kind we have been considering. The test involves 
valuing the net outputs of the project at all possible producer prices which could 
apply before the project has been put into effect. In the special case considered in 
Section 9 of a small country exchanging traded goods at the border price vector 
pT , it follows that these border prices are appropriate for valuing traded goods in 
our cost-benefit test for a supply side efficiency gain.
Note that, even though the cost-benefit test p z  >  0 for all p £ P(y)  may 
be passed, this does not imply that p z  >  0 at the new equilibrium producer 
price vector p. Of course, profit maximization implies that p z  >  0 in the new 
equilibrium. Nevertheless, this equilibrium could still have p z  =  0. Also, in this 
case a Pareto improvement might require the project to be adopted at less than 
full scale, with y p =  Xz  for some A satisfying 0 <  A <  1. If p z  >  0 in the new 
equilibrium, however, then profit maximization implies that y p must equal z, with 
the project adopted at full scale.
11. Practical Limitations
Supply side policies by themselves do not necessarily produce improved al­
locations from the point of view of consumers. There are, of course, increased 
efficiency gains for producers as a whole, in the sense that total profits are higher 
than they would be if producers did not react to the price changes. But those con­
sumers who have been relying on protected or uncompetitive industries for their 
livelihoods, directly or indirectly, are obviously vulnerable. The classical theory 




























































































policies, requires potential losers to receive lump-sum compensation. These must 
compensate individual consumers for any loss of earnings they will suffer after 
the firms which they own, manage, or work for are closed down because they are 
inefficient. The level of damage needing to be compensated, however, depends on 
several factors such as how long the employee would have remained with the firm, 
which is often not known. Thus adequate lump-sum compensation schemes will 
too often tempt employees and other suppliers to overstate the true extent of their 
losses.
We have presented an alternative second best case for using supply side policy 
to enhance production efficiency and increase profits. This rests on a different kind 
of compensation that may be a little easier to put into practice. As the supply 
side policy reform comes into effect, it is initially required that all consumer prices, 
including hourly wage rates net of tax, should be frozen. Then markets must be 
cleared by adjusting only producer prices, along with the tax wedges between 
these and the fixed consumer prices. In addition, all after-tax dividend payments 
to individuals should also be frozen by adjusting the corporate tax system. With 
such a freeze on prices, wages and dividends after tax, the supplies of labour and 
the demands for final goods in the consumption sector of the economy should all 
remain fixed. But production has become more profitable, so that there must 
be some extra tax revenue for the government. This can then be used to make 
everybody better off by means of some uniform poll subsidy or other tax change 
which benefits everybody, provided consumer prices, wages and profits remain 
frozen so that nobody is made worse off as a result of some price change induced 
by a change in demand caused by making somebody else better off. We showed 
how this could often be done even though paying a poll subsidy would itself affect 
the market clearing vector of producer prices.
A price, wage and dividend freeze on the demand side of the economy may 
appear to be a theoretical possibility, but it poses many practical problems. For 




























































































a less productive quality of labour, but enforcing this is bound to create prob­
lems in practice. Relying on adjusting consumer tax rates (including tax rates 
for labour income) in order to clear markets is also likely to create many bu­
reaucratic problems and to involve large administrative costs. Within the Eu­
ropean Community, for instance, such fine timing of tax rates would also vio­
late many of the present rules against those specific subsidies to particular firms, 
industries, or regions of a country which the theory requires. Tax harmoniza­
tion will make appropriate compensation even harder. Finally, this theory re­
quires that the time paths of prices, wages and dividends be fixed at the levels 
they would assume in the absence of market integration. For most such prices, 
however, there is very little information from future markets or elsewhere which 
can be used to decide what these time paths would be more than a few months 
ahead. So the information needed to implement the freeze properly is simply 
lacking.
It is probably better, therefore, to seek something less ambitious than a Pareto 
improvement from market integration and other supply side policies. Then, how­
ever, the case for these policies becomes much weaker. If those who lose are 
particularly deserving, their losses will be more important than the gains of oth­
ers, and one cannot favour such policies without some form of compensation. If 
the compensation is less than perfect, however, the same remains true — some 
individuals lose overall, while others gain, and there is no way to avoid comparing 
different individuals’ gains and losses. All one can say is that, if better schemes of 
compensation are introduced for those who lose the most and whose losses are of 
most social concern, then it is more likely that the gains from supply side policies 
will outweigh the losses. It is important, however, to ask what compensation will 





























































































Appendix: Proof of Existence
As before, suppose that there is an initial allocation (xI, y J ) £ f l ie r  A ' x 
f f Y 1 for which E ,e /  x* =  T while for each i £ I  the initial
net demand vector x' maximizes U'(x') subject to x* £ X '  and qk x' <  fh'. 
Now, for each k £  AT, i £  and s >  0, let B'(s) and £'(s) denote respectively 
the budget set { x ‘ 6 X '  \ qk x' <  m' -t- s } and the corresponding demand set 
argmaxxi { U'(x') \ x' £  B'(s)  } that consumer i in nation k faces when consumer 
prices are fixed at qk and unearned income is fixed at m', but there is a poll 
subsidy of s. Of course it must be true that x' £ £'(()) for all i £ I.
Write x := Y lie i  an(i Yk ■= Y!,j€Jt Y 1 ■ Then it was also assumed that the 
set of possible restricted union wide international production plans
- * ) : = {  v *  £ n t6 V *  I E 'keK yk =  x - z )
is a bounded subset of %ta K .
Define the unit ball B  := {p  £ RG | ||p|| <  1} in 3f°, where ||p|| := 
[S jeG  (Ps)2] denotes the usurd Euclidean norm of p. For each firm j  £ J 
and producer price vector p £ B, let
7T>(p)
arg
max { p y1 \ y1 £ Y 1 } 
y‘
denote firm j ’s profit-maximizing net supply vectors and maximized profits at that 
price vector. Note that xJ(p) >  0. Of course, it is possible that r)] {p) =  0 and 
7rJ(p) =  -foo. Nevertheless, for each nation k £ K  and producer price vector 
p £ B,  let
Vk(p) := Y ,jeJk V’ {P) 
*k(p) := E > e j k * ’ (P)
arg
max {pyjt I Vk €  Yk }
denote respectively the profit maximizing aggregate net supply correspondence 
and the maximum possible aggregate profit. Assume (as in the main part of the 




























































































Following Guesnerie (1979), a tight semi-market equilibrium in this world 
economy with frozen consumer prices and dividends but variable producer prices 
and poll subsidies specific to each nation in the customs union is defined as a 
producer price vector p £ B, a collection s k of poll subsidies (all k £ AT), together 
with an (equilibrium) allocation (x ^ y 1) £ IL eR  IL 6/4 £’(«*) *  l i f e r  7 J(p) for 
which £ . 6/  x' =  V1 +  *■
EXISTENCE T heorem . Suppose that, in addition to the assumptions set out 
above, the initial allocation (xI,y J ) satisfies {x1} =  £'(0) for all i € I- Then 
there exists a tight semi-market equilibrium, as defined above, with the additional 
properties that, for each k £ K ,  both s k >  0 and the national budget constraint
# h s k =  p(z* +  y*) +  (y* - p ) x k — rhk
is satisfied, where fn k := Y lie ik and x k :=  Y lie h
PROOF: By hypothesis, the restricted set Y K(x_—z) of possible international pro­
duction allocations within the customs union is bounded. So there are upper 
bounds y l  and lower bounds y k such that y K £  Y K(x — z) only if y k = yk =  y \  (all 
k £ K ) .  Define y* :=  Pt- Note that any feasible allocation (xr,y J ) must
satisfy the inequalities
I ' S r ' S j ’ +  z - z!' (a11 i e  y t =  y t =  y l  (all k e K ).
Now, let e 6 be any strictly positive G-vector, and define the compact
sets
X * := { *■' e  X { | < y m + z  -  £  ^  + e } * S /);
Tit := { yt 6 | yt -  e S; y* £  yj +  e } (all k e  A').
Also define the restricted budget, demand and national aggregate supply corre­
spondences by:
B'(s)  := { x i £ | y* x i <  m { +  s } (all i £ /) ;
f '(s )  :=  arg max { U'(x')  | x' £ B'(s) } (all i £ /);
X*





























































































Note that, when s >  0, the sets X '  (i £ I), F* (k £  K ),  and so B'(s)  are all 
compact and also non-empty. Moreover, since variations in s affect only consumers’ 
wealth levels and not the prices they face, it is easy to adapt standard arguments 
showing that the correspondences £'(s) (i £ I)  and rjk(p) (k 6  K )  must have non­
empty, convex and compact values, as well as closed graphs. Later on we shall 
make use of the following two product correspondences:
-  n K „  n , S I.  « '< » )  -  n , „  * w -
As in Debreu (1959), it is enough to prove existence of an equilibrium relative 
to these restricted correspondences. For:
Lemma. Suppose that p  £ B, that s k >  0 (all k £  K ),  and that the allocation 
(x 1, y K) 6 t T(sK ) x fjK(p) satisfies ** =  S t g * - Vk +  Then there is an 
entire allocation (xI,y J) £ FLeA Ilie/* H **) x Ilje./ 'f'(P) satisfying £ , eI £' =  
YljeJ  y1 +  z, as required for equilibrium. Moreover qk x ’ — m ‘ +  s* for aii i £ ft  
and all k £ K .
PRO O F: Under the hypotheses of the Lemma, the allocation ( x 1, yK ) is feasible, 
implying that y k S  fit = y*k (all k £ K )  and that x ' S y *  +  z -  £* (all i £  I).
For any k £ K ,  suppose that yk is any net output vector satisfying yk £ Y*. 
Since Yk is convex, for all A £ [0,1] the convex combination t/*(A) := yk +  A (yk — 
Vk) €  Ft- Moreover, if A >  0 is small enough, theny — e'S yk(X) =  j/| +  e, implying 
that yk(A) £ F*. Because y k £ ijk(p), it follows that
p y k >  p y k W  =  p y k +  kp{yk  -  yk)
and so p y k >  p y k ■ Since this is true for all yk £ Fit, one has yk £ r]k(p) - 
E , g j„ r/3(p), and so y1 £ q’ (p) for all j  £  Jk.
For any k £ K  and i £ Ik, suppose that x ‘ £ X '  is any net trade vector 
satisfying x' =  y* +  z  — —k and 9* x‘ <  m‘ +  s k. Then there exists x' £  X ‘ 
near x' with U'(x’) >  U'(x')  and qk x' < m' +  s k. So any such x ' £  C (s k). Since 
x ’ £ C ( s k), while x 1 £ X 1 and x' = y*+z~Y(,h^i £*! it follows that qk x' =  m ‘+ s k.
Now suppose that J* >  0 and i £ /*. Suppose too that x' £ X '  is any 
net trade vector with U'(x')  >  U'(x’). Since X '  is convex, for all small e >  




























































































x ' +  A (x" — x') are members of X ‘. Since U‘ is continuous and quasi-concave, 
both U'(x')  >  U'(x')  and U’(x'(X)) >  U'(x')  for all sufficiently small e and 
A, while x'(A) <C y* +  z — x h +  e also. Now, because i ’s preferences are
locally non-satiated at x'(A), there is an infinite sequence of points xj, £ X ‘ 
satisfying U'(x'n) >  U'(x’(X)) >  U'(x')  (n =  1 ,2 , . . .)  that converges to x'(A). 
Since x ‘ £ £'(s*), it follows that xj, £ B '(sk) and so qk x'n >  m' +  i*  (n =  1 ,2 ,.. .) .  
Taking the limit as n —* oo gives qk x'(A) >  m* +  s k, and so
qk x'(A) = qk x '  + X q k (£' — x ‘) > m ' +  s k =  qk x ' .
Since A >  0, this implies that qk x* >  qk x' =  m' +  s k. But qk x' =  m* <  m' +  s k
and so
rh' +  s k =  qk x' <  qk x' =  qk x ’ +  eqk (x* — x 1) < (1 — e) qk x' +  e (m ‘ +  Sk).
Therefore qk x' >  m ’ 4- s k. This proves that x' £ i ' ( s k) in case s k >  0. On the 
other hand, if s k =  0, then x ’ £  f'(0) =  ?'(0) =  {x*} because x* £ X ' and so 
x* £ f'(0). In either case, therefore, x ‘ £  C ($k) (all i £  Ik) for all J* >  0. |
The existence proof will now be completed by applying Kakutani’s fixed point 
theorem to the Cartesian product of four suitably defined correspondences. Of 
these, the first two are the consumers’ demand correspondence ^I(sK) and the 
nations’ aggregate supply correspondence rjh’(p) defined above.
Third, the producer price vector p will be adjusted to z, the value of the 
aggregate excess demand vector £ , e /  yj ~ z - Thus, we define the price
adjustment correspondence P  : SRG —«  B  by
if z ^  0; 
if z =  0.
Its value therefore includes the single point z /||z || on the boundary of B  unless 
z =  0, in which case it consists of the whole of B. The correspondence P  has 
non-empty, convex values and a closed graph. Its domain is bounded and convex. 
Fourth and last, for each nation k £ K  let
<xk(xk,yk,p) ■= max {°-£
(zk +  Vk -  Xk) +  qk x k -  m k +  1 -  |
# h
be the function indicating how much non-negative poll subsidy is to be paid out 




























































































Each function <rk is continuous throughout the compact convex domain D k := 
Ylieik X '  x Y k x B, and so the range S k := (7k(D k) C 9?+ is compact. In fact S k 
is also a connected interval of the real line, so a convex set.
Notice that because of the definition of S k, the restricted demand £‘(s) will 
be non-empty for every i £  Ik and s £  S k. Even at the lower bound of S k one 
has £'(0) =  £'(0) =  {£'} because x' £ X ‘ and because of the hypothesis that each 
individual’s demand set is single-valued in the initial situation.
Let D  be the Cartesian product domain fL e / X '  x riteft- Yk x B  x r itg /c  S k 
and then define the correspondence F  : D  —h D  so that
F ( x , y K,p , s K) := £'(aK) x fjK(p) x P ( ^ _ e / x* ~  H k€K yk ~  *)
x I I  46Jf^ * ( E i6/l *'•»*•*•) >■
Note that D  is compact and convex, while F  has non-empty, convex values and 
a closed graph. By Kakutani’s theorem, F  has a fixed point which we denote by 
(x ^ y ^ p , s K ). To economize on notation, let
* * := E i6/. (al1 k e  A' ); f  := =  E . - e i fi; y := T , keK yk-
To demonstrate that this does give the required strict semi-market equilibrium, 
we will show that ||p|| =  1, that x =  y +  z, and finally that s k >  0 (all k £  K ).
For all k £ K ,  note that x ‘ € £'(sk) (all t £ Ik). The budget constraint 
therefore implies that qk x' <  m' +  s k. Moreover, the earlier Lemma assures us 
that this is an equality when x =  y +  z. Therefore
? * * * < £ _  (m' + sk) = m k + # I ksk ( 1)
with equality when x =  y +  z. Because s k =  <rk(xk, y k,p), it follows that
# I k sk <  max {0, p(xifc +  yk -  x t ) +  # I k s k +  1 -  ||p||} (2)
with equality when x =  y +  z. So
0 < max { —# I k s k, p ( z k +  yk -  **) +  1 -  ||p||} (3)




























































































Since p £ P ( i  — y — z), note that i  ^  y +  z would imply that p ( i  — y — z) =  
||x — y — z\\ >  0 and ||p|| =  1. Suppose that ||p|| <  1 were true. Then one would 
also have x — y +  z, and so (3) would imply that
p(z* +  Vk -  f t )  +  1 -  ||p|| <  0.
But then summing over k gives
p ( z  +  y - x )  +  # K  (1 -  ||p||) <  0
which is impossible if ||p|| <  1, since that implies x =  y +  z. Therefore ||p|| =  1 
after all.
Thus (3) reduces to
0 <  max { - # / t  sk, p(zk + yk -  i t ) }
which is only possible if 0 < p ( z k +  yk — f t )  or s k =  0 (or both) for each k. 
But, since f t  £ £*(«*) and also £t(0) =  {it}> it follows that .5* =  0 implies 
f t  =  f t -  Then, however, our hypothesis that p y k > p y k for all p ^  0 implies 
that p (z t +  yk — f  t) >  p (z t +  Vk — i t )  =  0 whenever s k =  0. Therefore, for each 
k one has 0 <  p { z k +  yk — i t )  with strict inequality if s k =  0. Summing over k 
then gives 0 <  p ( z  +  y — x) with strict inequality if any sk =  0. Yet, as remarked 
earlier, x ^  y +  z  would imply that p(x  — y — z) >  0 — a contradiction. Therefore 
x =  y +  z. Since this implies that 0 =  p (z +  y — x ), one must also have s k ^  0 
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